Order on Defendant\u27s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs\u27 Verified Complaint (Harmony Land Company, LLC et al.) by Long, Elizabeth E.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions
6-30-2014
Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Verified Complaint (Harmony Land Company,
LLC et al.)
Elizabeth E. Long
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations
Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons
This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Business Court Opinions
by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Institutional Repository Citation
Long, Elizabeth E., "Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint (Harmony Land Company, LLC et al.)"
(2014). Georgia Business Court Opinions. 305.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/305
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
ST ATE OF GEORGIA 
HARMONY LAND COMPANY, LLC, 
KENT HASSELL, FREDERICK 
SUMMERS, CLIFTON SMITH, OLD 




REYNOLDS CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, 
Defendant. 
) 










r °FILED IN OFFICE 
JUN 302014 - (; 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY, GA 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT REYNOLDS CAPITAL GROUP, LLC'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
On June 26, 2014, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument on 
Defendant Reynolds Capital Group, LLC's ("Reynolds") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint. Upon consideration of the argument of the parties, the briefs submitted on the 
Motion, and the record of the case, this Court finds as follows: 
In March 2002, Plaintiff Harmony Land Company, LLC ("HLC") leased 3 77 acres of 
undeveloped land in Putnam County, Georgia, for a term of 99 years (the "Leasehold"). In April 
2006, Southeast Landco, LLC ("SELCO") entered into the Lease-Sale Contract agreeing to 
purchase HLC's remaining interest in the Leasehold in exchange for $4.5 million and six free 
lifetime golf memberships. Under the Lease-Sale Contract, SELCO would either provide six 
lifetime memberships in a new golf club built on the Leasehold if it was completed within three 
(3) years of the assignment of the lease, or, if a golf club was not built on the Leasehold after the 
initial three (3) years, SELCO would provide lifetime memberships to the Reynolds Plantation 
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Golf Club (the "Club") on neighboring property. According to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Reynolds' 
affiliates owned the Club. The Lease-Sale Contract stated that the obligation to provide the 
memberships was "a covenant running with the land and shall encumber the Leasehold Estate." 
The Lease-Sale Contract also stated that "All memberships and upgrades issued hereunder shall 
in all other respects be subject to the rules and regulations of the club as they may exist from 
time to time." According to the Complaint, SELCO is now Reynolds. 
Sometime before August 31, 2006, SELCO (or Reynolds) presumably assigned the 
Lease-Sale Contract to Linger Longer Development Company ("LLDC"), a company allegedly 
affiliated with SELCO.1 On August 31, 2006, the closing date, HLC transferred all of its rights, 
title, and interest in the Leasehold directly to LLDC, by executing an assignment and indemnity 
agreement. By August of2009, a golf course had not been built on the Leasehold and HLC 
received six memberships to the Club? In May 2011, a receiver was appointed to manage 
LLDC's assets. In August 2012, the receiver sold the Club to a new owner, who terminated 
HLC's memberships. The issue before the Court is whether Reynolds has a continuing 
obligation under the Lease-Sale Contract to provide lifetime dues-free golf memberships at the 
Club to members ofHLC. 
A court should grant a motion to dismiss when a plaintiff "would not be entitled to relief 
under any state of facts that could be proven in support of his claim." Northeast Georgia Cancer 
Care, LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 28,29 (2009). In ruling 
1 Neither an assignment of the initial Lease-Sale Contract nor a separate lease-sale contract 
between HLC and LLDC (if there are such documents) are a part of the pleadings, but ultimately 
HLC assigned its Leasehold to LLDC not SELCO or Reynolds. 
2 While Plaintiffs aver in their Complaint that they "enjoyed the benefits of dues-free, Lifetime 
Golf Memberships at Reynolds Plantation" from August 2009 to August 2012, it does not state 
who conferred these memberships to them. 
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on such a motion, the Court must accept as true all of plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations, 
and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. Baker v. Mclntosh County Sch. Dist., 264 
Ga. App. 509, 509 (2003). The Court finds that a determination of the parties' rights and 
obligations cannot be determined at this preliminary stage of the litigation on the face of the 
pleadings alone, and Reynolds' Motion to Dismiss is therefore denied. 
1. Reynolds argues that the promise to provide lifetime memberships to the Club was a 
covenant running with the land. 
Reynolds first argues that the Lease-Sale Contract expressly states that the obligation to 
provide free memberships "shall be a covenant running with the land and shall encumber the 
Leasehold Estate." However, HLC argues that the agreement to offer free golf memberships at a 
club located on a separate parcel of land from the Leasehold is a collateral agreement that cannot 
run with the leasehold because the covenant does not affect the "nature, quality, value, use, 
occupation, or enjoyment" of the Leasehold. See Ricketson v. Bankers First Sav. Bank, FSB, 
233 Ga App 11, 13 (1998) (finding that right of first refusal to buy neighboring parcels was 
personal contract and not a covenant running with the land). "If the covenant is of a collateral 
nature to the land, and is incapable in law of attaching to the interest or estate granted, it is a 
personal obligation, and will not bind or pass to assignees, even where they are expressly 
named." Goldberg v. Varner, 72 Ga. App. 673,677 (1945). The Court agrees. The only 
promise of lifetime golf memberships that could be a covenant running with the land would be 
golf memberships in a golf club built on the Leasehold, not at the neighboring Club. 
If the obligation to provide golf memberships at the neighboring Club does not run with 
the land, the question then becomes whether this personal obligation was assigned to LLDC, the 
entity which ultimately took possession of the Leasehold, or remained with Reynolds. Whether 
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the parties intended for Reynolds to be released of any obligation to provide lifetime Club 
memberships when it transferred its interest in the Leasehold to LLDC is not before the Court on 
this Motion to Dismiss. 
2. Reynolds argues that the memberships could be terminated under the express 
language of the Club's Rules and Regulations. 
Reynolds next argues that the Lease-Sale Contract made clear in Paragraph 16( d) that the 
"lifetime memberships" were subject to "the rules and regulations of the club as they may exist 
from time to time." In support of its Motion, Reynolds attaches a copy of a document called 
"The Club at Reynolds Plantation Rules and Regulations." These rules, in Paragraph 13(d), state 
that the Club reserves the right "to terminate any and all memberships for any reason" and "to 
sell or otherwise dispose of the Club Facilities in any manner whatsoever." 
HLC argues that the Court may not consider this unsigned, unauthenticated, hearsay 
document in support of Reynolds' Motion to Dismiss because it was not included with Reynolds' 
pleadings. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c) (noting that motion for judgment on pleadings is 
converted to motion for summary judgment if matters outside pleadings is considered). The 
Court agrees. "The Club at Reynolds Plantation Rules and Regulations" were not attached to the 
pleadings and were not incorporated into the pleadings by reference through the generic mention 
of "the rules and regulations of the club as they may exist from time to time" in the Lease-Sale 
Contract. 
Further, the COUli declines to convert this motion into a motion for summary judgment 
because "[ e ]vidence offered on motion for summary judgment is held to the same standards of 
admissibility as evidence at trial, and evidence inadmissible at trial is generally inadmissible on 
motion for summary judgment" and the Rules and Regulations supplied as an exhibit to 
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Defendants' Motion to Dismiss are unauthenticated hearsay under the Georgia Rules of 
Evidence. See Hagan v. Goody's Family Clothing, Inc., 227 Ga. App. 585, 586 (1997) (citing 
Hall v. Cracker Barrel, etc., 223 Ga. App. 88,92 (1996)). 
Accordingly, Reynolds' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED thiSW1S day of June, 2014. 
ELIZAB:t::::~GE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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Copies to: 
At,t,orneYs for Plalntiffs Attorneys for Defendants 
Keith S. Hasson B. Wan-en Pope 
Michael F. O'Neill David M. Barnes 
Hasson Law Group, P.C. King & Spalding LLP 
3379 Peachtree Rd, NE, Suite 625 1180 Peachtree Street 
Atlanta, GA 30326 Atlanta, GA 30309 
678-701-2869 404-572-4600 
keith{a),hassonlawfrou12.com WQo12e@kslaw.com 
mike(a),hassonlawfrou12.com dbarneseakslaw. com 
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